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Abstract
This note shows that if the space of events is sufficiently rich and the subjective
probability measure of each individual is non-atomic, then there is a σ-algebra of events
on which everyone will have the same probability, and moreover, the range of these
probabilities is the entire segment [0, 1].
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1 Introduction
An important assumption in the formal analysis of social choice theory is the existence
of social lotteries, that is, lotteries whose outcomes are social policies.1 Such lotteries
can increase the fairness of the social allocation mechanism or solve disputes in a cheap,
efficient manner. For a social lottery to work, it must be considered fair by all individuals
in society. Formally, if society finds it optimal to randomize over the k pure social policies
s1, . . . , sk by using the probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pk), then everyone in society must
agree that the mechanism is indeed using these probabilities.2
But do such mechanisms exist? Even in the model of Anscombe and Aumann [2],
where each decision maker is assumed to face subjective horse lotteries and objective
roulettes, it does not follow that all decision makers agree on what is objective. An
Italian-speaking person, facing a die whose sides are marked Uno, Tre, Cinque, Sette,
Otto, Dieci will consider the event “the die will show an odd number” to be objective,
while a non Italian-speaking person will consider it subjective (or even ambiguous). Noth-
ing in the assumptions and structure of the Anscombe–Aumann model implies agreement
on what is a roulette lottery. The issue is even more critical in Savage’s [12] framework,
where all events are assumed to be subjective.
Recently, Ghirardato et. al. [6] showed that even if probabilities don’t exist (that is,
beliefs are ambiguous), it is still possible, under some assumptions, to obtain mixture-
like operators over random variables. But these procedures are subjective, and cannot
be jointly used. Machina [11], on the other hand, assumes that preferences are smooth
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and proves that for each r ∈ [0, 1] there is a sequence of events En such that for each i,
µi(En)→ r. Unfortunately, the limits of these sequences of events don’t exist.3 Moreover,
from the social point of view it may be important for everyone to agree that an event
has probability exactly 1
n
, not approximately 1
n
.
In this note we show that if the space of events is sufficiently rich and the subjective
probability function of each individual is non-atomic, then there is a σ-algebra of events
over which everyone will have the same probability function, and moreover, the range of
these probabilities is the whole [0, 1] segment. In other words, even in a fully subjective
world (for example, Savage’s), there is a rich set of events that can be used for joint
randomizations. We prove existence, but we don’t know how to construct specific such
σ-algebras. This does not annul the contribution of this note. Randomization in social
choice theory plays an important theoretical role, but it doesn’t necessarily follow that
policy makers do actually randomize. Our aim is to close a theoretical gap that exists in
the literature—if commonly accepted devices do not exist, then models using random-
ization to enhance fairness would become void. Theorem 1 shows that there are enough
events over which decision makers agree.
2 A Theorem
Theorem 1 Let µ1, . . . , µn be nonatomic, countably additive probability measures on a
measurable space (S,Σ). Then there is a sub-σ-algebra Σˆ of Σ on which all the measures
agree, which is rich in the sense that for every real number r ∈ [0, 1], it contains a set of
(unanimous) measure r.
Proof : We start by using a well known result of Dubins and Spanier, which is restated in
the Appendix. According to their theorem, it is possible to partition S into two sets E0
and E1 = E
c
0 belonging to Σ such that µi(E0) = µi(E1) = 1/2, for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let
A1 denote the σ-algebra generated by this partition, namely A1 = {∅, E0, E1, S} ⊂ Σ.
Repeating this operation, we can partition E0 into two disjoint sets E00 and E01,
and also partition E1 into two disjoint sets E10 and E11, so that µi(Eb1b2) = 1/4 for
all i = 1, . . . , n and b1 = 0, 1 and b2 = 0, 1. Let A2 denote the σ-algebra generated by
{E00, E01, E10, E11}. Note that A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂ Σ.
Proceeding in this fashion, for each m, partition S into 2m pairwise disjoint sets
Eb1···bm , where each bj ∈ {0, 1}, satisfying
Eb1···bm−1bm ⊂ Eb1···bm−1 ,
and
µi(Eb1···bm) = 1/2
m
3For example, let the event An be “the n-th digit to the right of the decimal point of the temperature
tomorrow will be odd.” Then as n→∞, all individual beliefs regarding these events will converge to 12 .
But we know of no sense of limit for which limAn exists as an event of probability 12 .
2
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Letting Am denote the σ-algebra generated by this partition, we have
Am−1 ⊂ Am ⊂ Σ.
Set A =
⋃∞
m=1Am ⊂ Σ. Then it is easy to verify that A is an algebra, but not a
σ-algebra, and that all the measures µ1, . . . , µn agree on A. Let µ denote the common
restriction of each µi to A. Then, for any dyadic rational q = k/2
m in the unit interval
there is a set E in Am ⊂ A with µ(E) = q.
Let Σˆ = σ(A) ⊂ Σ, the σ-algebra generated by A. By the Carathe´odory Extension
Theorem (see Appendix), µ has a unique extension to Σˆ, which we again denote by µ.
Since this extension is unique, each µi agrees with µ on Σˆ.
Moreover the range of µ is all of [0, 1]. To see this, let r belong to the unit interval.
Then r has a binary expansion r =
∑∞
m=1 bm/2
m, where each bm is a binary digit (bit),
0 or 1. For each m, choose the set Fm ∈ Am by
Fm =

∅ if bm = 0
E 0···0︸︷︷︸
m−1
1 if bm = 1.
Note that µ(Fm) = bm/2
m. By construction, the sets Fm are pairwise disjoint. (To see
this, suppose Fk and Fm are nonempty with k < m. Then Fk = E 0···0︸︷︷︸
k−1
1 and Fm is a
subset of E 0···0︸︷︷︸
k−1
0, which is disjoint from Fk.) Thus the set F =
⋃∞
m=1 Fm belongs to Σˆ
and satisfies µ(F ) = r.
3 An Example
The following example shows that we cannot extend our result to more than a finite set of
individuals. For consider the countably infinite set {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Let S = [0, 1] equipped
with its Borel σ-algebra, and let {qi : i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} be an enumeration of the rationals
in [0, 1) where q0 = 0. Assume that Person i’s subjective probability Pi has the density
fi given by
fi(t) =

1
2
t < qi
1− qi
2
1− qi t > qi
Note that P0 is just Lebesgue measure.
We now want to show that there is no event A such that Pi(A) =
1
2
for all i = 0, 1, . . . .
Suppose A is such an event. Computing the probabilities according to person 0 and
person i > 0, we obtain
3
1. λ(A ∩ [0, qi)) + λ(A ∩ [qi, 1]) = 12 .
2. 1
2
λ(A ∩ [0, qi)) + 2−qi2−2qiλ(A ∩ [qi, 1]) = 12 ,
where λ is ordinary Lebesgue measure. The solution of this system is λ(A∩ [0, qi)) = qi/2
and λ(A ∩ [qi, 1]) = (1− qi)/2. For all rationals a and b it now follows, by taking qi > b,
that λ(A ∩ [a, b]) = (b− a)/2.
It is well known (see for instance, Halmos [7, Theorem A in §16, p. 68]) that there is
no Lebesgue measurable set (and so no Borel set) satisfying this property.
Appendix
The following well known result is due to Dubins and Spanier [4]. It may also be found in
Aliprantis and Border [1, Theorem 12.34, p. 445].
Dubins–Spanier Theorem Let µ1, . . . , µn be nonatomic probability measures on a measur-
able space (S,Σ). Given α1, . . . , αm ≥ 0 with
∑m
j=1 αj = 1, there is a partition {E1, . . . , Em}
of S satisfying µi(Ej) = αj for all i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m.
Dubins and Spanier also include a lesser known result, which is a slight sharpening of part
of the Lyapunov Convexity Theorem. It shows that the family of events on which the measures
agree is rich, but it does not show that it includes a rich σ-algebra.
Dubins–Spanier [4, Lemma 5.3] Let µ1, . . . , µn be nonatomic (countably additive) proba-
bility measures on a measurable space (S,Σ). Then there is a subfamily {Eα : α ∈ [0, 1]} of Σ
satisfying
µi(Eα) = α for all i = 1, . . . , n,
and
α < β =⇒ Eα ⊂ Eβ.
A complete statement of the Carathe´odory Extension Theorem may be found in Aliprantis
and Border [1, Theorem 9.22, p. 343]. For our purposes, we need only the following special
case.
Carathe´odory Extension Theorem Let A be an algebra of subsets of X and let µ be a
probability measure on A. Then µ has a unique extension to σ(A), the σ-algebra generated by
A.
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